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The recent financial crisis has drawn the attention of researchers and regulators to the 
importance of liquidity for stock market stability and efficiency. The ability of market-makers 
and investors to provide liquidity is constrained by the willingness of financial institutions to 
supply funding capital. This paper sheds light on the liquidity linkages between the Central 
Bank, Monetary Financial Institutions and market-makers as crucial elements to the well-
functioning of markets. Results suggest the existence of causality between credit conditions 
and stock market liquidity for the Eurozone between 2003 and 2015. Similar evidence is 


















“Liquidity is the lifeblood of financial markets”
1
. It is a complex and multi-faceted 
concept. Though widely recognized, to the present, neither a generalized definition of 
liquidity nor a single measure capturing all its dimensions has become unanimously accepted. 
Nevertheless, a common ground point is that liquidity reflects the easiness of realizing 
transactions between agents within the financial system. Hence, liquidity risk arises from the 
fact that, in equilibrium, individuals prefer to have liquidity combined with the possibility of 
not being liquid at some point in time. 
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the importance of liquidity as a precondition 
for market completeness. Historically, market liquidity risk has been stable and persistent, 
though the occurrence of rare and episodic events revealed the inelasticity of liquidity supply 
during crisis. This sudden liquidity “dry-up” may cause large falls in asset prices, not 
explained by changes in the fundamentals, and augmented by downward spirals: fire sales and 
deleveraging as means to meet capital ratios and margin calls. 




Graph 1 exhibits the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio for the Eurozone
3
 and clearly 
illustrates the aforementioned illiquidity spikes for 2008-2009 and 2011-2012, precisely the 
periods following the financial and the European sovereign debt crisis, respectively. 
                                                          
1
 See Fernandez, F. A. (1999), Liquidity risk. SIA Working Paper 
2
 Measures the elasticity of stock prices relatively to trading activity, further detail in Section 3 
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Market liquidity influences a diverse spectrum of macroeconomic indicators as well as 
the decision-making of both firms and investors. Næs et al. (2011) evidence that stock market 
liquidity is positively correlated with current and future economic growth rates and a robust 
predictor of several macroeconomic aggregates. At the firm level, Khapko (2009) concluded 
that firms with less liquid stocks tend to have higher debt ratios and are less likely to issue 
equity. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) prove the existence 
of a liquidity risk premium for holding illiquid stocks, controlled for other risk factors.  
The global financial crisis of 2007-08 has changed the paradigm for the entire financial 
system, with consequences for stock market liquidity. Central banks have developed 
accommodative policies, through liquidity emergency programs, reduction of policy rates and 
the expansion of monetary bases, loan provision to banks or asset purchase programs 
(quantitative easing). Initially aimed at reducing financial market distress, these policies also 
attempted to stimulate the real economy, although the effects at broad monetary aggregates 
were residual since banks preferred to hold reserves. Facing rating downgrades, banks had to 
deleverage to comply with higher capital standards and lowered the access to funding to 
investors. The current market microstructure is characterized by fragmented large trades, less 
structured products, increasing electronic trading and more high-frequency traders, which 
reduce transaction costs but still fail to supply liquidity during turmoil periods. 
This paper aims to examine the theoretical and empirical relationship between the 
Eurozone’s overall credit conditions – the willingness to provide funding liquidity to market 
intervenients - and stock market liquidity. Credit conditions are assumed to be driven by the 
monetary policy stance and resultant interbank market dynamics, changes in monetary and 
credit aggregates, as well as the Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) balance sheet size and 
composition. 
 




2. Literature Review 
The literature on stock market liquidity is extensive. Nevertheless, only very recently 
studies have investigated the liquidity linkages within the financial intermediation chain, 
mainly the existence of feedback mechanisms, as well as spillover effects from monetary 
policy and funding liquidity. This section briefly describes the existing literature on stock 
market liquidity and details the interactions between drivers of overall credit conditions and 
stock market liquidity dimensions. 
According to Lybek and Sarr (2002), liquid markets tend to display five distinct and 
complementary characteristics: tightness; immediacy; depth; breadth and resiliency. Tightness 
gives respect to low transaction costs, while immediacy defines the speed or order execution, 
together with the efficiency of trading, clearing and settlement systems. Depth refers to the 
existence of abundant orders, below the security price. Breadth means that orders are 
numerous and large in volume, with minimal impact on prices. A market is said to be resilient 
if new orders flow quickly to order imbalances and attenuate price movements away from 
fundamentals. 
In a different perspective, some studies have attempted to validate theoretical properties 
generally associated with market liquidity. First, commonality in liquidity outlines the fact 
that exogenous shocks simultaneously affect all securities in a given market and across 
markets, representing a level effect. Further, the “flight-to-quality” effect reports investment 
allocation changes from small to large caps or ultimately from stocks to bonds, since shocks 
are more prone to affect securities with higher volatility, indicating a slope effect. Asymmetry 
gives respect to the non-linear response of some liquidity dynamics to exterior innovations, 
which are more informative when the risk level is already high. Finally, recall that liquidity 
appears to be inelastic in the short-run and is intrinsically related to volatility. Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2009) developed an equilibrium model in which market and funding liquidity 




are mutually reinforcing and sustained by these propositions. Consistent with the latter 
predictions, Fontaine and Garcia (2015) observe these same properties for the NYSE, from 
1986 to 2012. 
Since the genesis of financial markets, intermediaries such as brokers and dealers, 
hedge funds and other liquidity suppliers have played a crucial role for market completeness 
and the allocation of capital across financial assets. Provided the intermediaries’ wealth is 
limited, their willingness to provide liquidity will necessarily depend on their ability to obtain 
funding. Moreover, funding risk and shocks are contingent on the status quo of credit 
conditions. Gromb and Vayanos (2010) document that market liquidity depends on 
intermediary capital, namely on the collateral-based financial constraints that limit investment 
capacity. Likewise, Johnson (2009) argued about the importance of the stock of liquid capital 
to accommodate trade demands and to adjust consumption as a determinant of market 
resiliency. Further, Valente (2010) underlines the existence of two extreme regimes: a binding 
regime in which funding and market liquidity are positively correlated, and a non-binding 
regime without any evidence of correlation, reaffirming the asymmetry property. Adrian and 
Shin (2010) describe how intermediaries adjust balance sheets and leverage through 
repurchase agreements, so as the direct impact of funding conditions to asset prices and 
liquidity. 
In the Eurozone, the dynamics between credit conditions and market liquidity are 
defined by specific interactions and responsibilities assigned to institutions, intermediaries 
and investors. Nikolaou (2009) distinguishes between three liquidity types. First, central bank 
liquidity, provided by the ECB, is measured by narrow money M1
4
. Second, funding liquidity 
is simply the ability of banks to meet their liabilities and to raise funding in short notice. The 
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 Following the ECB notation,  equal to currency in circulation plus overnight deposits within the ECB 




liquidity sources of MFIs are deposits, the ECB, the interbank market and the asset market. 
Third, the characterization of market liquidity is similar to previous mentioned findings.  
Liquidity linkages amongst all types enhance the smooth functioning of the financial 
system during normal times, but also represent propagation channels of liquidity risk during 
turbulent periods. In fact, a virtuous circle stimulates liquidity flows easily during stable 
periods. The ECB, monopoly-provider of liquidity, supplies the liquidity amount that brings 
interbank and policy interest rates into equilibrium. Subsequently, liquidity is received by 
banks and redistributed accordingly through interbank and asset markets to liquidity-needing 
agents. Finally, financially constrained agents demand the necessary amount of liquidity to 
satisfy funding necessities, generating a new aggregate liquidity demand to banks and to the 
ECB and a new circle begins.  
On the opposite, coordination failures among depositors, banks and intermediaries fed 
by asymmetric information and incomplete markets, create a vicious illiquidity spiral in the 
system. The fragile nature of banks derived from balance sheet maturity mismatch allied to 
fears of counterparty credit risk, deposit withdrawals, and ultimately bank runs trigger a 
liquidity shortage and the impairment of the interbank market. To avoid liquidation costs, 
banks restructure portfolios and enter in fire sales of distressed assets, aggravated by trading 
frictions. As in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), the liquidity spiral continues with the 
gradual decrease in asset prices and net worth of investors, forcing to further leverage 
adjustments in order to meet solvency constraints. Instead, the asset market could have caused 
the downward spiral. In response to falling asset prices, investors reduce positions, leading to 
higher transaction costs and losses on existing positions, exacerbating funding risk.  
Several studies corroborate the existence of such mechanisms in practice. Gagnon and 
Gimet (2013) evidence a positive impact on funding and market liquidity following a 
decrease in the policy rate. Also, Fernández-Amador et al. (2013) conclude that the EONIA 




and monetary base growth Granger-cause stock market liquidity, while evidence for a 
reversed relationship is weak. Chordia et al. (2005) report the monetary policy stance, in the 
form of net borrowed reserves, as a driver of stock market liquidity. On the contrary, 
Chatterjee (2015) finds evidence that asset market liquidity explains the liquidity creation of 
large banks. 
Given these points, there is a compelling evidence to assume that the activity of both the 
ECB and MFIs is an important factor to determine credit conditions in the Eurozone. 
Considering this, it is relevant to assess the decision-making evolution of both intervenients in 
the context of pre and post-crisis periods. Until 2008, the ECB has only used conventional 
policy instruments. Following the 2008 financial collapse, it has enacted credit support to 
financial institutions, several asset purchase programs and, more recently, its first quantitative 
easing (QE) program. Nevertheless, the decline in the money multiplier illustrates the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy, particularly relevant when interest rates are at the zero-
lower bound (Valiante, 2015). Most liquidity injected in the financial system has been 
accumulated in the form of reserves and in the deposit facility.  
Conversely, banks funding practices have also changed in the last decade. In detail, the 
recourse to non-core liabilities (i.e. liabilities other than retail deposits) and the ongoing 
growth of the outstanding amounts of equity funds units demonstrate the maturation of the 
capital-market based “shadow” banking model.  
This study contributes to the existing literature by investigating the joint dynamics of 
the ECB and MFIs actions on the funding provision to intermediaries and investors, 
particularly their subsequent impact on stock market liquidity. Furthermore, the long time 
span considers a period of transversal changes for the European financial system. The purpose 
of this project disregards the microstructure characteristics of all trading systems considered, 
as well as country regulatory and accounting frameworks. 




3. Methodology & Results 
In order to accurately describe the dynamics between credit conditions and stock market 
liquidity, it is relevant to consider the aforementioned liquidity spirals, potential sources of 
endogeneity in the system. Provided there are reasons to expect bidirectional causalities, this 
relationship is examined by specifying a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. By their linear 
structure, VAR models became popular after Sims (1980) proposed them as an improvement 
to models with simultaneous equations, and have empirically proven to provide superior 
forecasts for macroeconomic and financial time series. However, VAR pitfalls arise in terms 
of parsimony, stationarity issues and coefficient interpretation. 
To pursue this analysis, four of the most developed European stock markets were 
considered, particularly Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The sample includes a 
total of 104 stocks included in the actual composition of the DAX, CAC 40, FTSE MIB and 
AEX stock indices, respectively. Stocks with non-available data or presenting discontinuous 
and outlier values were not considered. All data was retrieved from Bloomberg, the ECB 
Statistical Data Warehouse and the Eurostat. The sample period starts in January 2003 and 
ends in September 2015, a total of 153 months. In this sense, it is attempted to encompass 
different macroeconomic and financial cycles, while avoiding an eventual structural break 
with the introduction of the euro in 1999 and less frequent observations for stock market 
liquidity variables until the end of 2002. 
3.1 Stock Market Liquidity Variables 
As pointed in the previous section, instead of reaching a unanimous single-measure and 
definition of stock market liquidity, past literature defined a set of characteristics a liquid 
asset or market must necessarily exhibit. Combining the research of Lybek and Sarr (2002) 
and Nikolaou (2009), three categories of measures were considered: volume-based, price-
impact costs and transaction costs. Notwithstanding, one should account that all categories are 




inter-connected and do not incorporate qualitative factors such as market microstructure, 
legislative frameworks, payment risks and settlement systems.  
First, a volume-based measure is mostly informative about trading activity and concerns 
market breadth and depth. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) stated that, in equilibrium, liquid 
stocks should be traded more frequently, since the costs of holding illiquid assets could 
optimally be spread for longer periods. In this sense, Datar et al. (1998) propose the turnover 
rate (TO) measure as a proxy for trading activity. The daily turnover rate of stock i is 
computed by dividing the daily number of shares traded by the number of shares outstanding.  
 𝑇𝑂𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑦 =  
# 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑦
# 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑦
× 100  (1) 
Second, indicators of price-impact costs aim to assess market resiliency and speed of 
price discovery. Particularly, they capture the price responsiveness to order flow movements 
since, intuitively, more liquid assets should be less sensitive to large and numerous orders. 
Orderly and resilient markets provide greater price continuity and lower volatility, key 
indicators of liquidity and critical for investment decision-making. The Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity ratio (AMIHUD) ascertains an elasticity dimension of liquidity, that is, the 
response of returns to 1 euro of trading volume. Despite being highly correlated with market 
capitalization and inflation, many researchers advocate its adequacy as a price impact 
measure. Contrary to the turnover rate, this measure is negatively related to liquidity and 
given by the ratio between the absolute daily return of stock i divided by the respective traded 
value in euro. 
 𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐻𝑈𝐷𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑦 =  
|𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑦|
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑦
× 106  (2) 
Third, transaction costs may be viewed as the price required by market-makers (brokers 
and dealers) for providing liquidity services and immediacy of execution, thus representing 
the cost of liquidity. In this context, the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) relative bid-ask 




spread (BID_ASK) is the most widely used measure. The spread depicts the sum of the 
buying premium and the selling concession and is computed as the ratio of the difference 
between the daily ask and bid price to the last price. 
 𝐵𝐼𝐷_𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑦 =  
𝐴𝑠𝑘−𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑦−𝐵𝑖𝑑−𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡−𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑑𝑎𝑦
× 2  (3) 
A preliminary analysis to the daily data for market liquidity measures exposed several 
anomalous and extreme values which could undermine the final results. Hence, for each stock 
index two filters were applied by deleting daily index indicators formed by less than 10 
observations of individual stocks and months with less than 10 trading days available were 
also removed. To aggregate each liquidity measure (MLIQ), the daily average of the liquidity 
measure for all individual stocks in the index is computed
5
. Finally, daily figures are equally-
averaged to obtain monthly-level indicators
6
, which subsequently are aggregated to an overall 
level by estimating a weighted average using the number of stocks corresponding to each 
index as the weights assigned
7
. 
3.2 Credit Conditions Variables 
Similarly, credit conditions cannot be assessed based on a single indicator. Instead, 
three major factors are considered: interbank market credit risk, the monetary policy 
effectiveness to stimulate credit creation, and the composition of bank liabilities. 
The interbank market is undoubtedly the major source of liquidity for MFIs. In this 
sense, a measure of the perceived risk and creditworthiness in this market may provide an 
accurate proxy of funding liquidity. As suggested by Brunnermeier (2009), market observers 
often focus on the TED spread, the difference between the 3-month U.S dollar LIBOR
8
 and 
                                                          
5 𝑀𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑑𝑎𝑦 =  
1
# 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑑𝑎𝑦
× ∑ 𝑀𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘,𝑑𝑎𝑦 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 = 1, … , #𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 ∧  #𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 ≥ 10 
6
 𝑀𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ =  
1
# 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
× ∑ 𝑀𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑑𝑎𝑦 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦 = 1, … , #𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ∧
#𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ≥ 10 
7
 𝑀𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ =  
1
# 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
× ∑(𝑀𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ × #𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 1, 2, 3, 4 
8
 London Intebank Offered Rate 




the 3-month U.S Treasury Bills rate. The spread measures the difference in yields between 
unsecured top-rated interbank loans and government seemingly ‘riskless’ credits, though after 
the financial crisis researchers often disagree on its definition and content. Although both 
rates tend to co-move, a TED spread widening is characteristic of a destabilizing spiral 
predictor, impacting both interbank liquidity and credit availability. To estimate the Eurozone 
analogous TED spread (TED_EZ), the difference between the 3-month Euribor
9
 and the 3-
month zero-coupon German bund is computed.  The German bund is frequently used as the 
risk-free rate benchmark for the Eurozone.  
 𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝐸𝑍𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ =  3𝑀 𝐸𝑈𝑅𝐼𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ − 3𝑀 𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝐵𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ (4) 
 The volume of money supply is the result of the transmission mechanism interaction 
between the central bank, the banking sector and non-financial intermediaries. In particular, 
money creation is ultimately linked to credit expansion and to the intermediation capacity of 
MFIs through the credit-deposit multiplier process. 
A traditional method to assess the monetary policy effectiveness and credit development 
is through the money multiplier approach, which presumes that broad money M3 is solely 
driven by narrow money M1 and the money multiplier (MM). Nonetheless, this proposition 
assumes that the behaviour of banks and the money-holding sector will respond in a 
predictable way to shocks in M1. By contrast, after 2008, in the context of extreme 
uncertainty regarding bank balance sheet soundness in the interbank markets, banks 
responded to the ECB liquidity stimuli by increasing reserve holdings beyond the minimum 
requirement. To demonstrate this point, it may be interesting to analyse the decomposition of 
the money multiplier: 









  (5) 
                                                          
9
 Euro Interbank Offered Rate - the rate at which a prime bank within the EU interbank market is willing to lend 
funds in euro to another prime bank. Several financial products are indexed to this rate. 








As can be derived, changes in MM are negatively driven by increases in the currency-
to-deposits ratio and in the reserves-to-deposits ratio. Intuitively, if currency holders retain 
more money as currency and banks hold more reserves, the multiplier effect through loans 
and deposits is reduced. Positive innovations in the reserves-to-deposits ratio underpin that 
MFIs are less willing to provide funding liquidity. On the other hand, the currency-to-deposits 
ratio may signal a twofold effect on stock market liquidity. The decision to hold currency 
instead of depositing or investing can be either caused by good credit conditions in the form 
of very-low interest rates or by a higher perception of risk and preference for liquidity. In 
short, both components of MM are included in the model to retain the informative power of 
both variables for coherence. 
At last, credit availability may be associated to the MFIs balance sheet size and 
composition not scrutinized by monetary aggregates. In a bank-based economy, MFIs are the 
most important financial intermediaries to which retail deposits (core liabilities) have been the 
main source of funding. Nonetheless, Hahm et al. (2013) report that whenever credit is 
growing at a faster pace compared to deposit levels, banks turn to other funding sources.  For 
this reason, the amount of MFI non-core liabilities is a prime indicator of higher credit 
availability and inherent lower external finance premiums, necessary conditions for easing 
credit conditions.   
The current systematic low-margin banking environment is leading to gradual 
deleveraging, thus benefiting the capital-market banking model. Namely, the on-going rise of 
the asset management activity in Europe has posed a good source of collateral for the repo 
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 C denotes banknotes in circulation, D denotes deposits in M3 (overnight deposits + deposits up to 2 years + 
deposits redeemable up to 3 months + deposits up to 2 years and redeemable up to 3 months) and R represents 
credit institutions’ reserves (ECB credit institutions current account +  ECB deposit facility) 




markets, key funding instruments for market-makers. All in all, to consider the impact of both 
factors for overall credit conditions, a final variable is included: 
 𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ = 𝑙𝑛(𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏.𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 11 + 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠/𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ)  (6) 
Where ln represents the natural logarithm and Non-core liab. the outstanding amount of 
MFIs non-core liabilities to which the outstanding amount of equity and non-money-market 
funds shares/ units is added.  
3.3 Adjustment of Time Series 
3.3.1 Control Variables 
As mentioned, the relationship between stock market liquidity and main financial and 
macroeconomic indicators has been thoroughly documented. Under those circumstances, 
failing to control for these exogenous factors may lead to inconsistent results. Thus, following 
Chordia et al. (2005), the weighted-average of monthly returns (MRET) and monthly standard 
deviation of daily stock returns (MSTDEV) are introduced, again considering the number of 
stocks as weights allocated to each stock index. Since the short-term business cycle and price 
evolution developments also represent crucial information criteria for the ECB, the annual 
rate of change of the Euro Area Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (IR)
12
 as a proxy for 
inflation and the Euro Area Industrial Production Index (IPI)
13
 are included. All four 
indicators are incorporated as exogenous variables. 
3.3.2 Stationarity Tests 
According to Lütkepohl (2005) every stationary, strictly non-deterministic process can 
be approximated by a VAR model. For this reason, dealing with non-stationary variables may 
result in spurious regressions, inconsistent estimators and subjacent incorrect causality test-
statistics. Provided this, to ensure that all variables are stationary and of the same order of 
                                                          
11
 Non-core liabilities = debt securities held + money market funds shares/ units + debt securities issued + 
remaining liabilities + external liabilities, extra Euro Area 
12
 Euro Area actual composition (19 countries) 
13
 Measures changes in output and activity of the industry sector excluding construction (NACE Rev.2, Eurostat) 
on a monthly basis, current base year is 2010 (Index 2010 = 100) and Euro Area actual composition (19 
countries)  




integration, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests
14
 were performed for all variables. Only 
for the currency-to-deposits ratio (CUR_DEP) and the inflation rate (IR), the null hypothesis 
of a unit root was not rejected at a 5% significance level. Therefore, first differences of both 
indicators were taken, dCUR_DEP and dIR, respectively. 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for all variables during the entire period covered by 
the sample. As projected, the time interval considered for this analysis comprises different 
financial and business cycles, emphasized by disperse values observed in the TED spread, 
monthly stock returns and in the industrial production index.  
Likewise, Table 3 shows pairwise correlation coefficients between all variables. The 
high negative correlation between non-core liabilities and the Amihud’s ratio indicates that 
the first may perhaps be a good estimator of the latter. Also, the market standard deviation is 
positively correlated with the turnover rate, the Amihud’s ratio and the TED spread, meaning 
that these variables could indicate market’s perception of increasing risk.  
3.5 Model Specification and Validation 
Accordingly, the following VAR model of order p is specified: 
 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐵0𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡15  (7) 
The procedure to select the optimal lag length must contemplate the consistency of the 
estimators and guarantee that innovations follow a White Noise process. Ultimately, it is 
implausible to satisfy both criteria simultaneously and avoid the trade-offs involved in this 
decision. For this purpose, the Akaike (AIC) and the Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) were estimated from lags 1 to 5
16
. The lag length that minimizes the AIC is 4 whilst the 
BIC is optimal for order 1, in line with the more conservative approach of the first measure. 
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 ADF test results are presented in Table 4 of the Appendix 
15
 yt is a vector of the 7 endogenous variables (TO, AMIHUD, BID_ASK, TED_EZ, dCUR_DEP, RES_DEP 
and logNCORE); A is a matrix of coefficients for endogenous variables; Yt-1 is a matrix of past values of all 
endogenous variables; B0 a matrix of coefficients for exogenous variables and the constant term; xt a vector of 
exogenous variables and a constant term; and ut a vector of residuals 
16
 Results reported in Table 5 of the Appendix 




As means to retain a simpler and more parsimonious structure, a VAR (1) model is therefore 
chosen. 
Nevertheless, in order to secure the whiteness of model residuals, the Lagrange-
Multiplier (LM) test was performed for the null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation of 
order 1 and rejected at a 5% significance level. To repeat the test in an ascending order, one 
more lag is added to the VAR model
17
. The test sequence was terminated at the lag length of 
4, for which the null of no residual autocorrelation was not rejected. In short, specifying a 
VAR (4) model satisfies the AIC and retains the asymptotic properties of the estimators. 
Before performing causality and structural analyses of the VAR model, the initial 
assumption of stability must be validated. Lutkepohl (2005) states that a VAR model of order 
p is stable if all eigenvalues of the A coefficient matrix have no roots within or on the unit 
circle, meaning that impulse response functions (IRFs) have known interpretations. After 
performing the test
18
, the results conclude that all the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle, 
thus the referred VAR model is stable. 
3.6 Causality Analysis – Granger-causality tests 
To interpret the results of the estimated VAR (4) model, Granger-causality tests
19
 are 
conducted to assess the existence of a statistically significant impact of credit conditions on 
stock market liquidity and vice-versa. This concept advocates that if variable x Granger-
causes variable y, then past values of x contain information to improve the estimates of y 
beyond past values of y alone. The null hypothesis states that the credit conditions (market 
liquidity) variable does not Granger-cause the market liquidity (credit conditions) variable. 
Table 1 reports Chi-square test-statistics and p-values for all the tests, divided by the two 
possible directions of causality.  
 
                                                          
17
 Results of the LM Test are presented in Table 6 of the Appendix 
18
 Results presented in the Annex 
19
 See Granger (1969) and Sims (1980) 




Table 1 – Granger-causality Tests 
All data considered in the sample was retrieved from Bloomberg, the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and the 
Eurostat from January 2003 to September 2015. Market liquidity variables included observations from 104 
stocks currently traded in the DAX, CAC 40, FTSE MIB and AEX stock indices. Stocks with non-available 
data or presenting anomalous values were not considered.  
Credit Conditions  
Market Liquidity 
TO AMIHUD BID_ASK 
(i) – Credit Conditions (row)  Market Liquidity (column) 





























(ii) – Market Liquidity (column)  Credit Conditions (row) 





























Note: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
Overall, the results of the Granger-causality tests corroborate that credit conditions 
Granger-cause market liquidity in all its three dimensions. Apart from certain exceptions, 
there is little evidence of a bidirectional causal relationship. In detail, the TED spread for the 
Eurozone, the currency-to-deposits ratio and the non-core liabilities of MFIs seem to be 
informative to predict simultaneously two market liquidity variables, whereas the reserves-to-
deposits ratio only has a statistically significant impact on the bid-ask spread. Conversely, the 
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio and the bid-ask spread Granger-cause the currency-to-deposits and 
the reserves-to-deposits ratios, respectively. 
3.7 Structural Analysis – Impulse Response Functions 
The causality analysis provided by the Granger-causality tests does not tell the entire 
story about the interactions between the variables. As results are based on single equation 
coefficients, they do not consider the joint dynamics in the VAR system. Hence, a clearer 
picture can potentially emerge by the use of IRFs. The IRFs represent the impact of a one-




time, unit standard deviation, positive shock to the impulse variable on the present and future 
values of the response variable in a higher dimensional system.  
Before conducting this procedure, some key issues must be addressed. First, Luktepohl 
(2005) asserts that IRFs are not statistically different from 0 if the impulse variable does not 
Granger-cause the response variable. Second, IRFs assume that a shock occurs only in one 
variable at a time. In order to ensure that shocks and independent, residuals are 
orthogonalized by a Cholesky decomposition. At last, the accuracy of results is sensitive to 
the ordering of variables in the VAR estimation. The Wold causal ordering determines that 
variables with greater transversal influence should be placed first. Following Fernández-
Amador et al. (2013), monetary and credit variables are placed before market liquidity 
indicators.  
Graphs 2-10 depict the one Cholesky standard deviation innovation impact on the 
response variable of interest for all significant Granger-causality interactions
20
.  
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 The remaining IRFs are presented in the Annex 
Graph 2 – Response of TO to TED_EZ Graph 3 – Response of TO to dCUR_DEP  
  
Graph 4 – Response of TO to logNCORE  Graph 5 – Response of AMIHUD to 
dCUR_DEP  
  
Legend:                     Orthogonalized IRF                             95% Confidence Interval Bands 





Overall, the IRF results are the empirical reflex of the financial theory and emphasize 
how changes in several aspects of credit conditions directly impact various dimensions of 
stock market liquidity. With certain exceptions, the impact of explanatory variables is only 
significant in the short-term, mainly on the first 3 months. 
Additionally, the signs of all IRFs confirm the hypotheses presented in previous 
sections. The TED spread has a negative effect on the turnover rate, while at the same time a 
positive effect on the bid-ask spread after a few months, hence positive shocks to this variable 
exercise a negative influence on market liquidity. As predicted, the currency-to-deposits has a 
Graph 6 – Response of AMIHUD  to 
logNCORE  
Graph 7 – Response of BID_ASK to 
TED_EZ  
  
Graph 8 – Response of BID_ASK to 
RES_DEP 
Graph 9 – Response of dCUR_DEP to 
AMIHUD 
  
Graph 10 – Response of RES_DEP to BID_ASK 
 
Legend:                     Orthogonalized IRF                             95% Confidence Interval Bands 




dual effect: negative on the turnover rate, lowering trading activity and positive to reduce 
price impact costs hereby represented by the Amihud’s illiquidity ratio. Further, the bid-ask 
spread response to a shock in the reserves-to-deposits ratio is positive, proving that if MFIs 
retain higher reserves intermediaries will have lower funding liquidity and therefore reduce 
their market-making activity. Moreover, increasing non-core liabilities significantly raises the 
turnover rate on the short-term, though has a lasting and structural effect on reducing the 
Amihud ratio. The latter result may indicate that financial intermediaries and investors do not 
have an immediate reaction to this variable, but instead tend to wait to adjust their balance 
sheets and funding constraints. Lastly, positive innovations in the Amihud ratio and the bid-
ask spread have a positive impact on the money multiplier, by reducing the currency-to-
deposits and the reserves-to-deposits ratios, respectively. This bidirectional causality effect 
proves the existence of a liquidity spiral only extended to the money multiplier level. 
3.8 Robustness Check – a similar model for the United Kingdom 
The aforementioned results are cemented on liquidity interactions within the bank-based 
financing structure of the Eurozone. For a market-centric economy like the United Kingdom 
(UK), the results may not hold. In fact, the ECB and the Bank of England (BoE) have differed 
on balance sheet composition and monetary policy intervention after 2008, as the BoE 
responded with greater quantities of bond purchases. Also, the interactions between agents in 
a different and more homogenous monetary financial system may lead to different 
conclusions. In this context, the previous model is replicated for the UK during the post-crisis 
period
21
. To ensure variable comparability, the data set starts in January 2010 and ends in 
September 2015. Stock market liquidity variables were retrieved by stocks currently listed on 
the FTSE 100. 
                                                          
21
 Similar adjustments to variables and model validation tests were conducted, leading to a VAR (2) estimation, 
while first differences of CUR_DEP_UK, RES_DEP_UK, NCORE_UK, IPI_UK and IR_UK were taken to 
guarantee stationarity. Variable construction and relevant test results are reported in the Annex 




Granger-causality test results are presented in Table 7, and confirm the hypothesis of 
causality between credit conditions and stock market liquidity for the UK, while proof for the 
hypothesis of reciprocal causality is less evident
22
. Accordingly, the IRFs plotted for 
significant causal relationships in Graphs 11-14 yield similar results relatively to the 
Eurozone. Positive innovations in the TED spread and the reserves-to-deposits are followed 
by increases in the Amihud illiquidity ratio in the short-term. Moreover, the reserves-to-
deposits ratio growth has a negative impact on the turnover rate, while the TED spread 
widening raises the bid-ask spread during a more prolonged period. To conclude, it is 
interesting to notice that both the currency-to-deposits ratio and MFI non-core liabilities fail 
to impact any of the stock market liquidity dimensions. Provided the more market-oriented 
action of the BoE, the impact of both variables on stock market liquidity is found to be less 
significant. 
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 At a 5% significance level, only the bid-ask spread (BID_ASK_UK) is found to Granger-cause non-core 
liabilities (dNCORE_UK) 
Graph 11 – Response of TO_UK to 
dRES_DEP_UK  
Graph 12 – Response of AMIHUD_UK to 
TED_UK  
  
Graph 13 – Response of AMIHUD_UK to 
dRES_DEP_UK 
Graph 14 – Response of BID_ASK_UK to 
TED_UK 
  
Legend:                     Orthogonalized IRF                             95% Confidence Interval Bands 





This paper examines the interplay relationship between the Central Bank and MFIs to 
determine credit conditions and the succeeding impact on stock market liquidity in the 
Eurozone from 2003 to 2015. In order to provide a fairly comprehensive picture of both 
concepts, several measures were integrated in the analysis and controlled for macroeconomic 
and financial variables. Further, the time span considered aims to enact the different behavior 
between agents during normal and turmoil periods. To test the model robustness, a similar 
procedure was conducted for a different monetary area, the UK. 
The main results confirm the initial premise and can be summarized as follows. First, 
credit conditions represented by the interbank market sentiment, the monetary policy 
effectiveness and the MFIs financing structure jointly determine stock market liquidity. In 
fact, all IRF signs corroborate the hypothesis that easing credit conditions affect positively all 
dimensions of market liquidity. Second, evidence for the existence of liquidity spirals and 
bidirectional causalities is rather weak and only found at the money multiplier level. Third, 
even though the main results are verified for the UK, the impact of the currency-to-deposits 
ratio and the non-core liabilities is not statistically significant in this case. 
This study leaves several doors open for future research. To start with, the impact of 
credit conditions on other asset markets (e.g. bond and derivatives markets) has yet to be 
investigated. Also, this relationship can be tested for European peripheral countries, 
particularly after the sovereign debt crisis. Bearing in mind the current transformations and 
challenges affecting financial markets, further analyses can incorporate the impact of 
regulations, capital standards and the increasing participation of high frequency traders. The 
possible existence of a flight-to-quality effect during the current QE program enacted by the 
ECB could also be assessed. Finally, an event study following the impact of ECB meeting 
decisions on both credit conditions and stock market liquidity may reinforce the results found. 
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Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
 
Observations Mean St. Deviation Min Median Max 
TO 153 0.005508 0.001038 0.003815 0.005367 0.010156 
AMIHUD 153 0.000851 0.000886 0.000188 0.000525 0.006338 
BID_ASK 153 0.004690 0.006385 0.001350 0.002768 0.058982 
TED_EZ 154 0.003888 0.004601 -0.000300 0.002100 0.028200 
dCUR_DEP 153 0.000221 0.000504 -0.002824 0.000227 0.002781 
RES_DEP 153 0.027101 0.014807 0.000014 0.019581 0.077107 
logNCORE 153 13.954049 0.126956 13.607562 14.013605 14.139865 
MRET 153 0.004442 0.049959 -0.153848 0.012710 0.154600 
MSTDEV 153 0.012732 0.006727 0.004862 0.011007 0.051116 
dIR 154 -0.000149 0.002614 -0.011000 0.000000 0.008000 
IPI 152 102.60342 8.580147 75.70000 103.25000 121.98000 
 



















Table 4 – Augmented Dickey-Fuller Stationarity Tests 
 
Variable / Null Hypothesis H0: Unit Root 
Turnover Rate (TO) 
-6.586*** 
(0.000) 








Eurozone TED Spread (TED_EZ) 
-3.802*** 
(0.003) 








Note: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance level 
 
TO AMIHUD BID_ASK TED_EZ dCUR_DEP RES_DEP logNCORE 
TO 1.000 
      AMIHUD 0.0392 1.000 
 
    
BID_ASK 0.0074 0.0812 1.000 
    TED_EZ 0.4377 0.1300 0.2897 1.000    
dCUR_DEP -0.0043 0.1480 0.0112 0.1181 1.000   
RES_DEP 0.0408 -0.0798 0.4695 0.3421 -0.0874 1.000  
logNCORE 0.2133 -0.6437 0.0967 0.4134 -0.2427 0.3405 1.000 
MRET -0.3782 -0.0937 -0.1320 -0.3391 0.0465 -0.0646 -0.1301 
MSTDEV 0.5548 0.4464 0.1989 0.7582 0.2180 0.2625 0.1327 
dIR -0.0310 -0.1252 -0.0074 -0.2455 -0.0563 -0.1201 0.0173 
IPI 0.3925 -0.1834 -0.0497 0.0138 -0.1427 -0.1578 0.1296 
 
MRET MSTDEV dIR IPI 
MRET 1.000 
   MSTDEV -0.4548 1.000 
  dIR 0.0218 -0.2557 1.000 
 IPI -0.1019 -0.0295 0.1494 1.000 




Variable / Null Hypothesis H0: Unit Root 




Stock Market Return (MRET) 
-10.676*** 
(0.000) 




Inflation Rate (dIR) 
-10.450*** 
(0.000) 
Industrial Production Index (IPI) 
-9.342*** 
(0.000) 
Note: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
 
Table 5 – VAR Order Selection Criteria  
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 4540.81    1.9e-35 -60.0775 -59.7921 -59.375 
1 5184.9 1288.2 49 0.000 6.9e-39 -68.012 -67.3271* -66.3261* 
2 5239.15 108.5 49 0.000 6.4e-39 -68.082 -66.9975 -65.4126 
3 5304.1 129.89 49 0.000 5.3e-39 -68.2946 -66.8105 -64.6417 
4 5357.85 107.51 49 0.000 5.1e-39* -68.358* -66.4744 -63.7216 
5 5403.35 91.008 49 0.000 5.6e-39 -68.3114 -66.0282 -62.6915 
Note: * denote optimal values for each criterion 
 
Table 6 – Lagrange-Multiplier Test for Residual Autocorrelation 
Lag Chi-Square Statistic df Prob. > Chi-Square Statistic 
1 106.0072 49 0.00000 
2 83.4792 49 0.00155 
3 70.8867 49 0.02207 
4 54.7008 49 0.26706 
H0: No autocorrelation at lag order 
 
Table 7 – UK Model Granger-causality Tests 
Credit Conditions  
Market Liquidity 
TO_UK AMIHUD_UK BID_ASK_UK 
(i) – Credit Conditions (row)  Market Liquidity (column) 




























(ii) – Market Liquidity (column)  Credit Conditions (row) 





























Note: P-values in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels 
